Amid concerns of how U.S. cities "sprawl", it is useful to look at the cities of other developed nations, in particular Western Europe which has attained U.S.-type prosperity, but which is reputed to have cities Americans should look to as a model. We examine recent data which suggest that there are substantial development and transportation similarities between the two groups and that the cities of Western Europe are becoming more like those of the U.S. JEL Classification R42, R48, R52 2
INTRODUCTION
We know that many of the world's great cities are special. We visit them because of their unique offerings and attractions. On top of culture, language, geography and history, many are also distinguished by policy and governance differences. Path dependence suggests that most of the differences will persist.
In this paper, we consider U.S.-western European city comparisons along various policy, human settlement, and passenger transportation dimensions. 1 The question addressed is whether, in the face of the previous remarks, urban planning policies matter. In their discussion of "urban sprawl," Nechyba and Walsh note that, "While we seek in this paper to address only the issue of urban sprawl in the United States, we suspect that greater insight into the causes of sprawl within the United States could be obtained from a better understanding of why cities in other developed societies look very different." 2 Our purpose is similar, but we are less sure of "very different." Some suggest that "sustainability" planning and its presumed requirements are much more strongly emphasized by European politicians and policy makers -and that this example should guide U.S planners. Others report that "urban sprawl" has come to Europe 3 . We also hear from critics that peculiar U.S. policies cause the "sprawl" that so many of them worry about. 4 Or is it, as Rybczynski has recently written, that "Virtually every technological innovation of the last fifty years has facilitated, if not actually encouraged urban dispersal" (italics added) and that is this a very broad tendency?
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A related question is whether there is an underlying market failure when it comes to U.S. urban development (Cervero, 1996) . Are people, especially those living and working in the suburbs, getting many goods and services that they are not asked to pay for? Kenneth Jackson has famously noted that "Tax, housing and gasoline policies doom our cities" (NY Times, June 9, 1996) . Or is the problem a policy failure instead? Has there been too much single-family home zoning (Levine, 2005) ?
And what about these two thoughts by Ed Glaeser? "I doubt that I would be in the suburbs if it weren't for the antiurban public policy trifecta of the Massachusetts Turnpike, the home mortgage interest deduction, and the problems of urban schools." (Glaeser, 2011, p. 167 ) And "Transportation technologies shape our communities, and modern sprawl is the child of the automobile. … As 4
European car ownership has increased, Europeans also moved to the suburbs." (Glaeser, 2011, p. 178) Which of these two sentiments dominates the choices of most people?
BACKGROUND
We can begin by citing Bruegmann's introduction to his recent book. He notes that "sprawl" is not new and not particularly American.
Most American anti-sprawl reformers today believe that sprawl is a recent and peculiarly American phenomenon caused by specific technological innovations like the automobile and by government policies like single-use zoning or the mortgage interest deduction on the federal income tax. It is important for them to believe this because if sprawl turned out to be a longstanding feature of urban development worldwide, it would suggest that stopping it involves something much more fundamental than correcting some poor American land-use policies. In the following chapters I will argue that the characteristics we associate today with sprawl have actually been visible in most prosperous cities throughout history. Sprawl has been as evident in Europe as in America and can now be said to be the preferred settlement pattern everywhere in the world where there is a certain measure of affluence and where citizens have some choice in how they live. Table 1 shows suburbanization trends in the largest cities of the developed world on various continents. Suburbanization appears to be dominant everywhere in spite of presumably different policies. More than one commentator has noted stability at the top of city-size rankings 7 . The biggest cities manage to stay on top. Success breeds success. But how? Typically, the biggest cities attract enough human capital to continue to be innovative. But in doing so, do they grow up or out? Suburbanization is seemingly the physical accommodation that usually goes with the process -by which sufficient human capital is retained and accumulated. The largest cities apparently provide ever more suburban living which is the choice of most their people. But they do this in a way that does not defeat their productivity advantage. To be more precise, cities survive and grow if they find ways to continue to reap net agglomeration benefits -if they somehow find spatial arrangements whereby many possible negative diseconomies and externalities are avoided while many positive economies and externalities are exploited. But this suggests the workings of market forces that are difficult for policy makers to overcome.
Second, for the U.S. the fifty states have been ranked in terms of various "economic freedom" indices, which include state as well as local policy differences (Ruger and Sorens, 2009 ). Yet, whereas U.S. cities' development patterns have been shown to differ in terms of the recentness of their greatest growth, often simply defined in terms of "frostbelt" vs. "sunbelt" cities (especially those in Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada and Texas), correlations between urban form and regulatory regime as measured by any of the economic freedom indices identified by the authors (fiscal policy, regulatory policy, paternalism) 6 Bruegmann (2005) , p 17 7 Duranton (2007) are not apparent. Combining various indices, the authors report that the "freest" states were reported to be New Hampshire, Colorado and South Dakota; the "least free" were New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, California and Maryland. No one suggests that U.S. metropolitan areas can be meaningfully grouped and differentiated by whether they are located in either of these two groups of states.
Whereas urban planning and development policies in Europe are usually a matter of national policy, they are mostly a matter of state and local policy in the U.S. A recent study by Pendall, Puentes and Martin 8 (applying factor analysis to survey results) has emphasized and described local land use planning and regulation policy differences through the U.S. But there are also moves in the U.S. to articulate a national urban strategy. There seems to be a desire among U.S. planners to "catch up" with their European counterparts. "Livability" and "sustainability" are ever more the stated policy goals of U.S. planners, many of whom make significant claims for the benefits of higher densities. As such, they look for ways to curb "urban sprawl" and promote "compact development." In October of 2010, the heads of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation and Department of Housing and Urban Development announced their "Partnership for Sustainable Communities."
9 They agreed that the three federal agencies would join efforts on behalf of various "Livability Principles", including "Provide more transportation choices … Promote equitable, affordable housing, … Enhance economic competitiveness, … Support existing communities, … Coordinate and leverage federal policies and investments, … Value communities and neighborhoods …" Beyond the politically correct clichés, the document announces the involvement of the U.S. federal government and its resources in steering how local areas grow and develop. But efforts to enact a livability program have failed thus far and the post-2010 leadership of the House of Representatives has stated strong opposition to such programs. This paper offers some comparisons between U.S. and western European cities. The cities of eastern Europe are left out because of their comparatively late start, with substantially rising affluence generally not occuring until after 1990. This is a compromise approach; many urbanized and urbanizing regions of the world are not included. The reason for the US-western Europe focus is that whereas international comparisons can be informative, they include the risks that come with differing measurement protocols. For the western-European cities, we prefer data sources that report on more than just one city (or metropolitan area) in more than one country. Admittedly, even the data aggregators (such as the UN, the EU and the OECD) accept varying data from local sources, but to the extent that some common vetting and screening were involved there is a degree of plausibility.
For purposes of clarity, it is useful to dispose of popular ideas like "automobile dependence" and various associated "addictions". It is fairly clear that as personal incomes rise, most people seek access to an automobile. The range and mobility are hard to beat. People like the greatly expanded choice set. As more people acquire greater range and mobility, origins and destinations disperse. And as trip-ends disperse, having a car becomes more desirable. This is a powerful positive feedback cycle. It also suggests that the expression "sprawl," though widely used, is not a useful descriptor because we are really discussing auto-oriented development. Dargay, Gately and Sommer (2007) document that the link between per capita income and auto ownership is a powerful and international phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the simple story is complicated by the idea of induced demand. Do we drive more because there are more highways or are there more highways because we drive more? Supply and demand are always interdependent and difficult to identify. Statistical tests are complicated by various feedback effects. Hymel, Small and Van Dender (2010) have explored some of these complexities. New lane-miles increase accessibility to new locations and also reduce congestion somewhat. But congestion also dampens the ability of new lane-miles to induce new vehicle miles traveled. Duranton and Turner (2011) also show that extra road and highway capacity do not reduce congestion; vehicle-kilometers traveled and lane-miles grow together.
The comparison with western European cities is interesting because U.S.-style highway building came much later than in the U.S. Nevertheless, in a 2008 debate between Baum-Snow and Cox-GordonRedfearn (CGR) on whether U.S. suburbanization was caused by the development of the U.S. interstate highway system, CGR showed that there was significant suburbanization in European cities whether or not there was a freeway that "pierced" the core city.
At this point all major western European metropolitan areas have reached a point where automobile travel exceeds that of transit, and usually by a large margin. This conversion began later than in the United States, for various reasons. The most important would appear to be their later achievement of high living standards than in the United States, a phenomenon that was postponed a decade or two by World War II and its aftermath.
POLICY COMPARISONS
The strategy of this paper is to describe the major U.S.-western Europe urban policy differences and also the settlement-transportation differences as best we can. Some policy contrasts are quite clear and others are less clear. The simplest involves the well known fact that Americans get their gasoline much more cheaply than others in the developed countries. Most other places levy much higher excise taxes. The Economist (Figure 2 ) recently showed a January 2011 comparison chart of dollar prices (including taxes) per liter. The U.S. was the only place with prices below one dollar. Most of the European countries were between $1.50 and $2 per liter and three (Greece, Denmark, Netherlands) were above $2. While the policy justifications for these levels of excise tax are complex and vary from place to place, expensive gasoline has often been thought of as a way to limit the outward growth of cities.
The second policy contrast involves the treatment of housing. Most economists oppose the U.S. mortgage-interest deduction of the federal income tax code on both equity and efficiency grounds. On the equity criticism, mostly middle-class homeowners are able to pay interest with pre-tax dollars. The tax law distorts price signals and encourages leverage for purposes of home ownership. It is also regressive, favoring those whose marginal tax rates are highest. For the purposes of our discussion, the policy has been seen as a contributor to "urban sprawl." But Table 2 shows that home ownership rates in ten western European nations are higher than in the U.S. while seven western European countries have lower rates.
In addition, the 30-year home mortgage so popular in the U.S. has been widely seen by economists as being subsidized via the formerly implicit and now explicit participation of the GSE's "Fannie" and "Freddie." But Jaffee offers a detailed comparison of U.S. and Western European mortgage markets. He finds that "… there is strong evidence that the mortgage markets of Western Europe have operated for decades with limited government intervention." (p. 14) And in spite of this, "… the U.S. is just the median -9 th out of 17 developed countries -in terms of its owner occupancy rate," (p. 16).
Addressing Glaeser's last point on school quality differences between U.S. cities and suburbs, such contrasts may be a smaller concern in European countries with national education systems. To be sure, there likely to be quality differences within any school system, but there is now a move towards national standards in U.S. schools in reaction to seemingly intractable performance differences among U.S. schools.
But there is more. Crouch et al (2007) suggest that the emergence of "modern town planning" in Europe goes back to UK town planning legislation of 1909 (many times elaborated since then) and has concerned itself with the control of "urban sprawl." Land use and development policies are complex and difficult to summarize, but various writers have provided assessments for Europe as well as for specific European cities. "Many European cities pursue relatively stringent land use policies … the European compact city concept generally focuses on relatively high-density, mixed neighbourhoods in terms of land use, that are well accessible by public transport …" (Koster and Rouwendal, 2010, p. 2) . "In the UK, reducing urban sprawl and revitalizing towns and cities have been dual, and related aims of the planning system and or urban policy for many decades … However, since the late 1980s these aims have been given a new language: that of sustainability. The 'sustainable city' is characterized in English spatial planning by the idea of the 'compact city. '" (Williams, 2004) . (2000) offers a detailed discussion of the suburbanization of people and jobs. Table 3 shows 1950-2000 population growth for the 38 largest U.S. urbanized areas, their core cities and suburbs. In all but one (San Jose with significant core city annexations), the suburbs grew by more than the core city. The other two core cities with significant 50-year growth started with small populations; Phoenix had 106,000 residents and Riverside-San Bernardino only 63,000, but even these two experienced greater suburban growth. Glaeser et al (2001) document "job sprawl" in the U.S. for 1996.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF OUTCOMES
The 2010 U.S. Census population data are now available and they show that the suburbanization trend continues. This is interesting in light of the many claims and predictions to the effect that settlement trends in the last decade included a "return to the cities." 10 In fact, however, the 2010 census shows (Tables 4a and 4b) that there were few urban cores that had densified in the United States. Nearly all of it occurred in the core municipalities of New York, San Francisco and Miami. Various other core cities have densified, but their increases have largely been from the development of greenfield land and even that at low suburban densities (like Rome, core municipalities such as Phoenix, Houston, Louisville and Charlotte have considerable suburban greenfield land within their boundaries)
To test the suburbanization trends question for the western European cities, we require data for at least two points in time for at least two geographical definitions of a place, usually city and suburbs. Urban Audit 11 provides demographic and economic data for most of the major European Union cities. Tables  5a and 5b show population data for the major Western European cities for which we have city as well as metropolitan area (Large Urban Zone, LUZ, is the label they use) information for two recent years (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) .
12 These show that thirteen of the eighteen (Berlin, Edinburgh, Frankfurt, Glasgow, Hamburg, 10 http://www.city-journal.org/2011/eon0406jkwc.html 11 http://www.urbanaudit.org/ 12 Larger Urban Zones (LUZ) denotes the program for designating metropolitan areas (labor market areas) in Europe. The program was established by the Urban Audit, at the direction of the European Commission. The LUZ definitions are established at the national level within the European Union and nations, which also establish their own unique criteria. Generally LUZs are designated at the NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 geographical levels, which correspond to internal political boundaries that can be from second level (such as the Ile-de-France in France to portions of municipalities, such as central London (the inner boroughs of the Greater London Authority). As in the United States, with its Helsinki, Lisbon, Liverpool, Madrid, Munich, Prague, Stockholm, and Zurich) experienced faster growth in their outer areas. To be sure, Liverpool showed population decline, but with slower decline in the suburbs. Four of the eighteen (Brussels, Copenhagen, London, Manchester) showed faster city growth than in the outlying areas (however each of these core cities remains below its population peak).
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Nevertheless most places for which we have data grew most in their suburbs. Couch et al (2007) consulted the same data source for the period 1991-2001. They showed that all but two (Copenhagen and Stockholm) had most growth in their suburbs in this decade.
Population shift data are also available from another source that considers several cities but for a longer period. 14 Table 6 Further, recent domestic in-migration data has generally shown the suburban areas to have more favorable trends than core cities, even in cases where the central cities are adding population. A review of domestic migration trends in 19 European metropolitan areas in the early and mid 2000-2010 decade indicated that all had more favorable trends in suburbs and exurbs than in the core cities 15 metropolitan area definitions based upon county-equivalents, the NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 criteria produce considerable inconsistencies, especially in comparative land areas.
13 Brussels peaked at 8 percent above its 2004 population in 1970, Copenhagen's peak was 52 percent higher in 1950, London's was 16 percent higher in 1939 and Manchester's 75% higher in 1931.
14 www.usk.stockholm.se/internet/pub/stat utg/nordtab2.pdf 15 (http://demographia.com/db-eurcitymigra.pdf)
The same trends are also documented in a third European data source from Kasanko et al (2005) who utilize the MOLAND (Monitoring LAND use/cover Dynamics) data derived from high-resolution satellite imagery to study development trends in 15 medium-sized to large European urban areas from the mid1950s through the late 1990s. 16 Plotting the growth of built-up areas vs. population growth, they find that for all but one area (Munich), they found that the extent of growth was greater than population growth. They conclude that, "This can be an indication of urban sprawl …" (p. 14). A similar trend is revealed in many of the developing world urban areas. 
TRAVEL TIMES
Cities are "the engines of growth" and without the innovation that can only occur in major cities, national economies could not advance. But as cities grow they grow outward. And as they suburbanize there is the prospect that travel distances, especially commuting costs, can become unbearably large. The land use accommodation that seems to emerge is the simultaneous dispersion of jobs and housing in patterns that limit trip lengths, especially in terms of time spent commuting, which is the cost that most people are attuned to. There is little reason to think that this process is not universal.
Further, cities are more productive where people are more mobile. This is indicated in research, for example, by Prud'homme and Lee 18 as well as Hartgen and Fields 19 showing that the more jobs that can be accessed in a particular period of time, the greater the economic output of a metropolitan area. Greater access to jobs not only improves economic growth, but it also opens up greater opportunities for people and households to fulfill their aspirations for a better quality of life.
For the U.S. we can look at the American Community Survey (pooled 2005-2007) which reports journeyto-work trip times. Table 7 shows data for the twenty largest urbanized areas (U.S. Census designation of functional urban areas) as well as for the total for the 74 urbanized areas with 500,000 or more residents in 2007. The average for all areas was 25.9 minutes with a standard deviation of 3.55 (also all modes, U.S. data calculations by Thomas A. Rubin). The small variance between these places suggests that the concerns over extraordinarily long work trips in more dispersed environments are misplaced.
Considering privately operated vehicles only, the principal city vs. suburbs difference of mean commute times for the group of seventy-four was remarkably small, just over one minute. For nine of the toptwenty urbanized areas, travel times were either shorter or less than a minute greater in the suburbs than in the central cities. Table 8 summarizes the U.S. Census and ACS metropolitan area data for broad area types for several years (all modes). There is seemingly very little change since 2000. Another U.S. data source (the National Household Travel Survey, NHTS) substantiates the same points. Tables 9a and 9b compare mean travel times for commuting as well as nonwork travel for two years (2001 vs. 2009 ) for four distinct urbanization types. The nine-year overall increase (all modes all metropolitan areas) for worktrips was small and only apparent in two of the sub-areas. And in both years, "suburban" travel times were less than "urban". "Second-city" (akin to "edge cities") were lower than either urban or suburban for both of the survey years. For the non-work trips, no changes between the two surveys are apparent. And, again, the "urban" trips are slightly longer.
Many of the nonwork trips are shopping trips. The International Council on Shopping Centers reports that there are more than 100,000 such places in the U.S. -and that these account for about one-half of all U.S. shopping space. The non-work trip data suggest, perhaps not surprisingly, that buyers and sellers co-locate in ways that allows them to keep doing business with each other. If shoppers choose suburban locations, so will shop owners. We see that "sprawl" does not imply traffic "doomsday".
What about western Europe? In 1997, Gerondeau noted that "The average home-to-work journey by car, despite the fact that it takes place during rush hours is 19 minutes in Western Europe, the same, in fact as in North America. (p. xxxv, emphasis in the original). He also compared average person-trips per day for the U.S (3.9) and Western Europe (3.2). A more recent report 20 summarized in Table 10 compares overall work-trip travel times for all 99 reporting U.S. metro areas (2007) and 92 European area (all of Europe); the travel times were 23.6 minutes for the U.S. and 25.6 minutes for Europe, both slightly larger than Gerondeau's averages. The slightly longer duration 21 trips reported for the European cities could be accounted for by the greater use of public transportation. The longest average duration work trips in the U.S. are in the New York metropolitan area (almost 33 minutes), but that area also has the highest proportion of commuters using public transit (more than 30 percent in 2010).
The Urban Audit data source includes average journey-to-work travel time (one way, all modes) for many of the EU cities and their metropolitan areas. Table 11 shows 2001 average commute times for the major western European places for which city as well as metropolitan area (LUZ) data were available. For seven of the ten, the metropolitan area average was lower than the city average, indicating slightly shorter average trip durations in the suburbs. This finding also echoes the findings for the U.S. cities. Suburban worktrips are not necessarily longer duration trips.
MODE CHOICE
But whereas U.S. land use planning has been mostly a local matter, transportation policy has had a much stronger national influence. U.S. highway user fees significantly cross-subsidize urban transit. nations (Table 12a ) are broadly suggestive of the fact automobiles carry a larger share of surface transport in the US than in the EU. However, the only level at which there is comparability is in the aggregate (Table 12b) , because of the important role, in both the US and EU of air transportation. At the aggregate level, the difference between the US and the EU remains, but is less pronounced.
The dominance of private auto use in the U.S. is clear and we have alluded to it in previous paragraphs and illustrations (Figure 3 ). In fact, we have described urbanization in the U.S. as simply auto-oriented development, which is a clearer representation than the pejorative and vague "urban sprawl". We have also found similar urban development in and around the western European cities. What is the role of the auto in Europe? Growing but not yet at the levels of the U.S. Table 13 shows the shares of auto use for commuting in major cities and metropolitan areas for various recent years. It has increased in most places over the time spans shown, but has not reached anywhere near the U.S. level. For mode shares as well as for commuting times, western Europe is more similar to New York than to the other U.S. large metropolitan areas. But New York has never stopped suburbanizing. Like New York, most western European cities continue to suburbanize.
CONCLUSIONS
In 1999, Pietro Nivola wrote, "With it's limited reach, it is fair to say that U.S. urban policy cannot even faintly 'Europeanize' the shape of American cities." (p. 52). Nivola showed that going back to federal urban renewal in 1949, a variety of policies had not changed the direction of U.S. urban development. What has happened in the years since 1999? Despite numerous assertions of an "urban revival", the 2010 census data for the U.S. show that suburbanization was still the dominant trend.
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In his 2006 review of a special issue of Urban Studies on Resurgent Cities, "Urban Myths and Policy Hubris: What We Need to Know," Cheshire noted the difficulties of making a policy impact on urban form. He pointed to the durability of physical forms as well as the "inertia exercised by the structure of property rights and the inertia imposed by norms and standards." (p. 1235). He reminded us that London after the fire of 1666, Chicago after its great fire, Berlin and Tokyo after aerial bombardments were all "rebuilt on their original layout." These observations complement the thoughts in the introduction, where we emphasized the idea that auto-oriented development is unlikely to be reversed or replaced. To be sure, Cheshire was referring to older city centers, whereas our observation focused on the outlying areas where most growth occurs.
Or are the European cities "Americanizing"? An interesting response is by Richardson and Bae (2004) , who claim that, "There appears to be convergence in settlement patterns in the U.S. and Western Europe." (p. 1) Bruegmann has a similar thought, writing that, "One of the most remarkable things about the development of European and American cities and suburbs since the 1970s has been the way in which they seem to be converging. In part it is because an increasing number of American central cities are becoming denser while European cities continue to decentralize." (p. 92).
But the convergence hypothesis is further challenged by the view that getting more Europeans out of transit and into an automobile is not much of a challenge, certainly when compared to getting Americans out of their cars and onto public transit. But the latter has been a U.S. policy goal for some years with no signs of any success. In other words, cities on both sides of the Atlantic are more likely to be Americanizing and also likely to continue doing so.
But the much bigger point is that for cities to continue in their role as the incubators of ideas and all the processes that create wealth, they will have to continue growing and that means suburbanizing. The biggest cities have been able to continue their important economic and cultural functions by growing outward. This should not be impeded. The good news is that efforts to do just that have apparently failed. The historical core municipality is the municipality with the largest 1940 population in the present metropolitan area (metropolitan statistical area).
There can be more than one historical core municipality in a metropolitan area, with the exception below.
There can be a second historical core municipality if (1) it is adjacent to a historical core municipality classified as " " (2) had a 1940 population at least 25 percent of the first historical core municipality and (3) a population density of at least 5,000 per square mile. Couch, et. al, , 2007, p. The "principal cities" definition, adopted in the 2000s, is substantially different from the former "central city" definition. Principal cities must meet population and employment thresholds and may be located anywhere in the metropolitan area (including outside the urban agglomeration). There also may be many principal cities. For example, the Los Angeles metropolitan area officially has 25. Thus, in many cases, there is no comparability between the former "central cities" and "principal cities." Our work in Tables 4 is designed to address this problem. 
